Beijing-Moscow Mathematics Colloquium (online)
摘要（Abstract）
One of the important questions in mechanism design is the implementability of allocation rules. An allocation rule is called implementable if for any agent, benefit from revealing its true type is better than benefit from lying. I’ll show some illustrative examples.
Obviously, some allocation rules are not implementable. Rochet’s theorem states that an allocation rule is implementable iff it is cyclically monotone. During the talk, I’ll present a new convenient topological condition that guarantees that cyclic monotonicity is equivalent to ordinary monotonicity. The last one is easy to check (in contrary to cyclic one). Graph theory and algebraic topology appear to be very useful here.
主讲人简介（Bio）
Lokutsievskiy L.V. is a specialist in geometric optimal control theory. He proved his habilitation thesis in 2015. Starting from 2016 he works at Steklov Mathematical Institute as a leading researcher.
